An auctioneer wants to sell an indivisible object to one of multiple bidders, who have private information about their valuations of the object. A bidder's information structure determines the accuracy with which the bidder knows her private valuation. The main result of the paper is that the auctioneer's revenue is a convex function of bidders' information structures. One implication is that assigning asymmetric information structures instead of symmetric information structures to bidders is always revenue-enhancing. This paper generalizes a result of Bergemann and Pesendorfer [3], who show that revenue-maximizing information structures are asymmetric. The main result of the paper is that the auctioneer's revenue is a convex function of bidders' information structures. One implication is that assigning asymmetric information structures instead of symmetric information structures to bidders is always revenue-enhancing. This paper generalizes a result of Bergemann and Pesendorfer [3], who show that revenue-maximizing information structures are asymmetric.
Introduction
In a standard optimal auction design problem, the bidders have private information about their valuations. Each bidder's private information typically is modeled through an information structure that is a joint distribution of the signal each bidder privately observes and of the bidder's private valuation, which is not observed prior to the bidding. Intuitively, an information structure describes how accurately the bidders know their private valuations by observing a signal. The auctioneer's objective is to maximize revenue which is a function of bidders' information structures.
In this paper I study the auctioneer's revenue given different information structures. I
show that the auctioneer's revenue is a convex function of bidders' information structures, and that assigning asymmetric instead of symmetric information structures to bidders increases this revenue. In particular, it is always revenue-enhancing to assign an information structure F to one bidder and an information structure G to another, instead of assigning the average information H = 1 2 (F +G) to each of them. Since the result holds for all information structures, neither F nor G needs to be optimal. This global property becomes relevant if assigning information structures to bidders is a costly activity for the auctioneer. For example, it can be too costly for the auctioneer to implement the revenue-maximizing information structure. The convexity result also applies if the bidders have some initial information structure, that restrict the set of final information structures to be "more informative" than the initial one. A revenue-maximizing auctioneer again prefers the final information structures to be asymmetric. Finally, as in every optimization problem, convexity implies that a local analysis is not sufficient to characterize a maximum. Relying on first-order conditions only, for example when choosing the optimal information structure in a parameterized family, can be misleading.
I derive these results under two important assumptions. First, bidders' private information, their signals, are independently distributed. Other comparisons would be trivial since the auctioneer can extract all the surplus when signals are correlated.
1 Second, bidders' private information is one-dimensional, since in this case implementability of an allocation boils down to a monotonicity condition.
This paper is closely related to Bergemann and Pesendorfer [3] (hereafter referred to as BP). BP consider an auction design problem with private values where a revenue-maximizing auctioneer first assigns an information structure to every bidder and then implements an optimal auction. 2 One of BP's main results is that revenue-maximizing information structures are asymmetric. Here, I extend this result to non-optimal information structures and to auctions with common values if marginal revenues are increasing or if utility is additive.
The two papers share the assumptions that bidders' private information is independently distributed and one-dimensional.
Several other papers also consider the auctioneer's preference for information. Esö and
Szentes [21] study the simultaneous problem of designing an information structure and an auction to maximize the auctioneer's revenue. Compte and Jehiel [13] show that dynamic auction formats generate more revenue than do their static counterparts if information is endogenous.
3
A large body of literature considers the bidders' and not the auctioneer's preferences for information in contractual relationships. Crémer and Khalil [14] , Lewis and Sappington [29] , and Crémer, Khalil and Rochet [15, 16] 4 all concentrate on information acquisition of the all-or-nothing variety. The agents have to decide either to become perfectly informed 1 See Myerson [33] and Crémer and McLean [17, 18] .
2 Alternative timing assumptions are that both decisions are taken simultaneously (Esö and Szentes [21] ), or that the auction format can be dynamic, such that further information can be acquired after the auction has started (Compte and Jehiel [13] ). 3 Cremer, Spiegel and Zheng [19, 20] consider sequential auctions where the auctioneer decides on the bidders' point of time of costly entry into the auction. This decision can be interpreted as a choice of when to provide the bidders with the relevant information to participate. The mechanisms in these papers are quite different. The auctioneer is a residual claimant, since bidders are uninformed ex ante, and thus his problem is to economize on agents' entry costs. 4 Other papers include Matthews [32] , who considers the endogenous accumulation of information in a pure common values auction, assuming special functional forms; Sobel [36] , who has looked at a related problem, but with exogenous information; and Lewis and Sappington [30] , who endogenize information acquisition and consider optimal organization design in a model with moral hazard.
or to remain completely uninformed. The driving force in these papers is then the possible bidder's ignorance. Persico [34] and Bergemann and Välimäki [4] use an intermediate concept of information where precision can be increased continuously (based on Blackwell [6, 7] , Lehmann [28] and Athey and Levin [2] ). Persico [34] compares the bidder's equilibrium incentives to acquire information in a first and second-price auction with affiliated values.
Bergemann and Välimäki [4] consider the distortions in the acquisition of information in efficient mechanisms.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is laid out in Section 2. Section 3 establishes the main result of this paper, that the auctioneer's revenue is convex in bidders' information structures, and considers some implications for the design of auctions. All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
The Model

Payoffs
Consider an auction with one auctioneer (he) selling one indivisible object to one of the n ≥ 2 bidders (she). The payoff of bidder i is assumed to be quasilinear and equals
where a i is buyer i's probability of getting the good and t i is a monetary transfer received by the auctioneer. Uncertainty is represented by θ = (
is common knowledge among the agents. u i (θ) is called additive if it can be represented as
The revenue of the auctioneer equals n i=1 t i . The set of feasible alternatives is 5 Additivity is, for example, assumed in Bikhchandani and Riley [5] , Bulow and Klemperer [11] and Jehiel and Moldovanu [25] . An alternative specification of common values is that all bidders have the same valuation V for the object (but observe different imperfect signals). A possible interpretation of additive values is that the component V is observed by everyone (for example, V could be the resell value in the 
A direct auction mechanism is a tuple (X i , a i , t i ) i=1...n with transfer payments of bidder
X i → R and bidder i's probability of winning the object (as a function of the realization of all the signals), a i :
The utility of buyer i, given the vector of information structures F and signals x, then equals
It is useful (see Section 3) to transform the signal space. 8 For each agent i, define 
, then has the following form:
and for a direct auction mechanism
..n the utility of buyer i, given information structure G and signals z, equals
9 Agent i is willing to pay w i (G, z) for the object if the signal z has been realized. w is called additive if it can be represented as follows:
10 I denote by Z −i the signal space of bidders other than i with z −i as a generic element. It is assumed that for all i, w i (G, ·) is sufficiently often differentiable in z and that agent i's willingness to pay is increasing in z i .
11
Bidder i's ex ante and interim expected utilities are denoted U i and U i (z i ), respectively.
The bidder's outside option is normalized to zero and has to be respected by the auctioneer
Auction
The marginal revenue from bidder i (for information structure G) is defined as
The auctioneer's revenue from implementing a direct auction mechanism (Z i , a i , t i ) i=1...n , given information structure G, then equals (for a binding outside option of zero):
9 For simplicity, I use the term "information structure" instead of 'vector of information structures'. The information structure of agent i is always denoted with a superscript i.
10 w is additive if u is additive and if the density function is independently distributed or a convex combination of independently distributed densities. More generally, w is additive if Z i is a sufficient statistic for θ i given Z, and if u is additive.
11 If (F i X ) −1 (·) is differentiable, then these two assumptions are equivalent to w i (F, x) being differentiable in x and agent i s willingness to pay being increasing in x i for all i. The latter property is guaranteed if the conditional distributions F (θ i | x i ) are ordered by first-order stochastic dominance (F (θ i | x) ≤ F (θ i | y) if x ≥ y) (see for example Athey [1] ). The first property holds if the conditional distribution
12 This is a well-known result for private values. But the same arguments can be used to extend the result to common values, as shown by Bulow and Klemperer [10] : quasilinearity implies that the auctioneer's revenue equals the expected value of the good minus bidders' information rents. Incentive compatibility and partial integration are then used to rewrite the interim utility of bidder i.
Definition 1 An auction mechanism
if for all i = 1 . . . n andẑ i and z i :
Definition 2 Marginal revenues are increasing for an information structure G if for all i
The auctioneer maximizes revenue, subject to incentive compatibility:
3 Convexity of the Auctioneer's Revenue
In this section I show that the auctioneer's revenue from an optimal auction is a convex function of the agents' information structures. Specifically, I conduct a comparative statics exercise where I compare two possible choices for the auctioneer. Let F, G and H λ be three information structures, where
The first choice is to implement an optimal auction when the information structure is H λ and derive expected revenue R *
The second choice is that with probability λ the information structure is F (and the optimal auction is implemented), and with probability (1−λ) the information structure is G (and the 13 See for example Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [31] for private values. All their arguments still hold if w is additive. However, they do not hold if bidders' private information is multi-dimensional, which explains why the assumption of one-dimensionality is required.
optimal auction is implemented). In this case the expected revenue is λR *
I then ask which of the two choices brings a higher revenue for the auctioneer. The interesting feature of this problem is that the choice of the optimal auction depends on the information structure. The next theorem compares the expected revenue from the two choices.
14 The theorem does not impose any further restrictions on bidders' information structures. In particular, the information structures of different bidders can differ.
Theorem 1 Let F, G and H λ be three information structures, where
Two properties have to hold for Eq. (10) to be true. First, implementing a H λ when the information structure is F or G yields a higher revenue than implementing a H λ when the information structure is
. This equation holds with equality since the transformation to the Z space implies that M R is a linear function of information structures. Second, a H λ has to be incentive-compatible when the information structure is F or G. This property is just assumed in Theorem 1. It then follows
I now provide two sufficient conditions that imply, not just assume, this second property.
The first condition is that w is additive. This implies that a() is incentive-compatible if
In particular, incentive compatibility is independent from the information structure (note that Z is always uniformly distributed).
14 This theorem and the subsequent results also hold for more general information structures G : (Θ × Z → R), where G is not just a vector of individual information structures G i , but a joint distribution of Θ and Z. In particular, the states θ i are not assumed to be independently distributed, whereas signals z i are. Note that the independency of z i and z j does not imply independency of θ i and θ j , although (z i , θ i ) and (z j , θ j ) are pairwise correlated. Further, notice that the pairwise correlation of (z i , θ i ), (θ i , θ j ) and (z j , θ j ) does not imply that (z i , θ j ) are correlated.
The second condition is that marginal revenues are increasing (Definition 2). If marginal revenues are increasing, the optimal allocation a k is increasing in z k for all k. This allocation is then incentive-compatible for all information structures. 15 As is well-known (see for example Fudenberg and Tirole [22] ), a sufficient condition is that the distribution G i satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition (which it does since G i (z i ) = z i ) and w i (G, z) is concave in z i . 16 But these sufficient conditions are overly restrictive, and therefore I follow Bulow and
Klemperer [10] and simply assume that marginal revenues are increasing. 17 In an environment where the auctioneer can choose the information structures, this assumption seems less problematic. Indeed, Bergemann and Pesendorfer [3] prove that the marginal revenues are strictly increasing for the optimal information structures. I can now formulate the theorem, where the assumption on the incentive compatibility of a H λ is replaced by assumptions on the environment. 
The convexity of the auctioneer's revenue in bidders' information structures is a corollary of this theorem when the environment is appropriately restricted. In such an environment, the auctioneer prefers an asymmetric allocation of information. 18 Let the first environment E 1 be 15 In an optimal auction design problem with a fixed information structure, it is a standard assumption that marginal revenues are increasing (Myerson [33] , Riley and Samuelson [35] , Bulow and Roberts [12] and Bulow and Klemperer [10] ). As Bulow and Klemperer [10] state, it is a regularity condition that is analogous to an assumption of a downward-sloping marginal revenue curve in monopoly theory. Note that Definition 2 is a condition for a fixed information structure that can be expressed equivalently in the X or Z space, and thus makes no implicit assumptions regarding an endogenous decision.
16 See Athey [1] for technical conditions on primitives u i and F i that ensure the concavity of w i . 17 If marginal revenues are not increasing, one has to follow the analysis of bunching in Myerson [33] and construct an 'ironed' marginal revenue curve, which is non-decreasing. 18 One implication of this preference for asymmetric information structures is that one should not expect the auctioneer to take any countermeasures (by lobbying for example) if bidders have different information. the one described in Section 2, with the additional restriction that w is additive. The second environment E 2 also equals the one described in Section 2, with the additional restriction that marginal revenues are increasing.
Corollary 1 Suppose the environment is E 1 or E 2 . Let I be a convex set of information structures. Then the auctioneer's revenue is a convex function of the information structures from the set I:
for all information structures F, G,
For all these results the transformation into the Z space is necessary for the proofs, for two reasons. First, incentive compatibility becomes independent from the information structure as discussed above. All changes in information are "loaded" into w, but this feature does not affect incentive compatibility in environments E 1 and E 2 . The second reason is that the marginal revenue is linear in the information structure. As discussed above, linearity implies
for information structures F and G, it then follows that λR A (F, a
Corollary 1 states that, if the set of "admissible" final information structures is restricted but convex, then the auctioneer's revenue is also convex on this restricted set of information structures. One interpretation here is a situation where bidders have some initial information structureG i before the auctioneer discloses any additional information. 19 Since bidders
There are two apparent examples of this asymmetry. In the market for mortgage-backed securities, Bear Sterns seems to have acquired a reputation for having superior information (see Glaeser and Kallal [23] ); in offshore oil and gas lease auctions, Shell was widely regarded as being better informed than other bidders, by virtue of access to "bright spot" seismic technology, and of employing the best seismic geologists (see Hendricks, Porter and Tan [24] ). 19 An alternative (more complicated) modeling of initial information assumes that bidders observe the signal before the auctioneer discloses more information. In the optimal auction problem, every bidder's private information would then be two-dimensional. As a consequence, there is no simple characterization of the optimal auction, which is needed in this paper. This is only one of the extensions considered in Esö and cannot be deprived of any information, the final information structures G i have to be "more informative" thanG i , restricting the set of "admissible" final information. 20 A simple example illustrates the results of this section.
Example 1 I consider a private values auction with two bidders where Θ i and u i both can take two values:
The prior probabilities of both θ and θ equal 1 2 . Every bidder can observe two signals, a low signal z and a high signal z. There are two different information structures, 'perfect information' F and 'no information' G. The following conditional probabilities characterize F and G:
. In other words, the signal z fully reveals θ when the information structure is F , and is uninformative about θ when the information structure is G. The conditional probabilities for the third information structure H =
and H(θ | z) = . I now compute the revenues from the optimal auction when i) bidder 1 has information structure F and bidder 2 has information structure G, and ii) both bidders have the same information structure H.
In case i), the optimal auction sells the object to bidder 1 if she receives the high signal z at a price of u. Otherwise the object is sold to bidder 2 at a price of 1 2 (u + u), the expected utility of an uninformed bidder. This mechanism is incentive-compatible and maximizes revenue since it extracts all the surplus. The expected revenue equals 1 4 u + 3 4 u.
In case ii), a second-price auction (SPA) maximizes revenue. In an SPA both bidders receive a high signal z with probability 1 4 , and the price then equals 1 4 u + 3 4 u, the expected utility of type z. For all other signal combinations, the second-highest bidder receives signal z and therefore the price equals u, which is smaller than the expected revenue in case i).
Szentes [21] ), who also allow the timing of actions to be determined by the auctioneer (but do not address the issue of convexity). 20 I do not provide a definition of "more informative" here, since what matters is that the set of final information structures is restricted. For a possible definition of "more informative" see for example Athey and Levin [2] . Standard definitions of this term, such as those in Blackwell [6, 7] and Athey and Levin [2] , fulfill the condition that the set of admissible information structures is convex. If two information structureŝ F andF are more informative than some information structure G, then λF +(1−λ)F is also more informative than G (λ ∈ [0, 1]).
An important assumption in the previous theorems is that the auctioneer implements, conditional on the information structure, the optimal auction. It is straightforward to compute examples establishing that this assumption is necessary. One would be a SPA in the environment of Example 1.
21 I now derive two implications of the convexity result, one on the revenue-maximizing information structure and one on asset design.
Asymmetric Information Structures
BP consider a joint maximization problem, where the auctioneer implements not only the revenue-maximizing auction but also the revenue-maximizing information structure. In an auction with pure private values BP demonstrate, without proving convexity, that the optimal information structure is different for different bidders. I can now show that BP's result is an immediate consequence of the convexity result in Section 3. An important restriction in BP is that BP's result applies only to optimal information structures. Convexity, on the other hand, is a global result and therefore applies also to nonoptimal information structures. The auctioneer prefers asymmetric information structures even if he cannot implement the optimal information structure (because this practice is too costly, for example). Another difference here from the approach in BP is that BP do not assume a continuous distribution. More precisely they do not assume a convex support for the set of valuations, which is a prerequisite for discussing convexity. This convexity 21 The necessity of this assumption potentially can explain the differences between my results and the findings of Klemperer [26] and Bulow, Huang and Klemperer [9] . These papers show that slight asymmetries among bidders, such as a small value advantage for one bidder or a partial ownership of the object by one bidder, can have large negative effects on revenue. By contrast, my results show that some asymmetry is revenue-enhancing even in auctions with common values. The main difference is that these other papers consider an ascending bid (i.e. English) auction, which in general is not revenue-maximizing in asymmetric auctions, whereas I consider revenue-maximizing auctions.
property also simplifies the proof of Proposition 1. Convexity is an elegant way of saying that discrimination, i.e. tying actions more closely to the agent's information, is facilitated in asymmetric environments.
Informational Aspects of Asset Design
In this subsection I show that the auctioneer also prefers some asymmetry in the informational content of the objects. Suppose that the auctioneer has some leeway in determining the object's riskiness. To be specific, assume that the auction designer has to make a decision whether he wants to split the object A into two equally risky ones A 1 , or whether he wants to split it into two assets with different risk properties A 2 and A 3 , where
The riskiness of each object A i is described through the corresponding information structure G i , which is defined on the same state space Θ and the same signal space Z. The auctioneer then implements the optimal auction to sell the object A i . The expected revenue from selling
The next proposition states that under the assumptions of Theorem 2, the auctioneer's revenue is higher if he splits the assets.
Proposition 2 Let A 1 , A 2 and A 3 be three objects whose riskiness is described through three different information structures G 1 , G 2 and G 3 , respectively. If either the marginal revenue M R(G 1 ) is increasing or if w is additive, then splitting the object A = A 1 + A 1 = A 2 + A 3 into A 2 and A 3 results in higher revenue:
A special case of Proposition 2 is when A 2 is a less risky asset than A 1 , and A 3 is a more risky asset than A 1 . 22 The proposition implies that splitting assets into a risky asset A 3 and a less risky asset A 2 increases the auctioneer's expected revenue. This is consistent with the 22 The argument here does not require "more risky" or "more informative" to be defined, since the proposition just assumes that the information structures are different. See Athey and Levin [2] for various possibilities for defining "more informative".
observation that an asset is often split into debt and equity, with high seniority for debt, before being sold. Boot and Thakor [8] give additional examples of splitting assets into components that are more risky and less risky than the composite asset.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1 Let f, g and h λ := λf + (1 − λ)g be the density functions corresponding to F, G and H λ , respectively. First I show that the marginal revenue is a linear function of bidders' information structures:
Linearity then implies that
where the inequality holds because a H λ is incentive-compatible when the information structure is either F or G.
Proof of Theorem 2
In case a), marginal revenues for information structure H λ are increasing, which implies that a H λ i (z) is weakly increasing in z i . Thus a H λ is incentive-compatible when the information structure is either F or G. In case b), an allocation a is incentivecompatible if and only if E Z −k a k (z k , Z −k ) is increasing in z k . Thus any allocation that is incentive-compatible for information structure H λ is also incentive-compatible for information structures F and G. Using Theorem 2 then completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1 This is an immediate implication of Theorem 2.
Proof of Proposition 1 Suppose the auctioneer chooses the same information structure G(·, ·) for all agents, i.e. G i (θ i , z i ) = G(θ i , z i ) for all i. Consider then two information 
